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Abstract 
A crucial theme in macroeconomic dynamics concerns the issue of determinacy, 
that is, the question of uniqueness or multiplicity of admissible dynamic trajectories. Unlike 
previous studies which economy addressed this question in a closed, we explore the 
determinacy dynamics in a small open economy. The structure of the model set forth, is such 
that it leads to a higher degree characteristic equation which cannot be handled analytically. 
By using a specific algorithm developed, we solve it and show that a form of a Taylor rule 
implies, for the parameter space examined, determinate equilibrium dynamics. In line with 
previous findings on determinacy, the case for a form of flexible Price Level Targeting (PLT), 
does not only hold in a closed economy but, also, extends with some modification, to a small 
open economy   as well. 
Keywords:  Taylor Rule, Open Economy Dynamics, Flexible PLT, Determinacy  
JEL Classification: C54, E52 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the so-called Taylor rules has had a major impact on the positive and normative 
aspects of monetary policy making (e.g. Koenig et al, 2012). In a seminal paper, Taylor 
(1993), used a monetary rule to address the question of monetary policy making, in the U.S 
(1987-1992); the appealing feature of being simple aided the issue of transparency. As an 
operational and descriptive frame, it became highly popular, sparking off a voluminous 
literature and a new agenda for further topics of research.  
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.A key normative implication of Taylor’s work, which has led to a distinct strand of literature, 
is that injudiciously designed rules may cause instability and multiple equilibria 
(indeterminacy/non-uniqueness). The intuition is simple. It is asserted, in this respect, that in 
the face, say, of an inflationary aggregate demand rise, the federal funds rate should respond 
in such a way so that real rates rise unequivocally, in order to stifle the incipient inflationary 
pressure (commonly known as Taylor’s principle); otherwise the whole process may evolve 
self-perpetuated, leading to instability. 
A number of notable studies, in this strand of literature, have approached the question of (in) 
determinacy from a variety of perspectives. Specifically, Clarida et al (2000), noted the 
transition from indeterminacy to determinacy since the early eighties (the Volcker-Greenspan 
era), owing to the toughening of the anti-inflationary stance. Other major studies, in this line 
of inquiry are Bullard and Mitra (2002), Kiley (2007) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2011). The former derives analytical conditions for determinacy when expectations are 
viewed as a learning process, while the latter seek to qualify Taylor’s principle regarding 
determinacy
1
, in case where trend inflation grows over time. More recently, Ambler and Lam 
(2015), in comparing Inflation Targeting (IT) with Price Level Targeting (PLT), conclude for 
the parameter space examined, indeterminacy does not arise under PLT (contrary to the case 
of IT). Also, in a broadly similar vein, Dittmar and Gavin (2005), in a RBC model with 
money, determined that with a zero policy coefficient on inflation, determinacy obtains when 
the policy coefficient on the price level belongs to the interval (0, 2).   
We propose to reconsider the issue, at hand, on two principal counts. First, in the light of 
earlier findings, instead of inflation targeting, we choose to focus on Price Level Targeting 
(PLT); several reasons have been adduced in its support together with an overall eclectic 
                                                          
1
 : Taylor’s equation was originally specified in real terms; when transformed into nominal, the Taylor principle 
states that the nominal rate response to inflationary hikes should exceed unity. 
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assessment (see Cecchetti,2000;Cote,2007;Khan,2009;Ambler,2010, among others)
2
. Further, 
as Ambler(2010), in particular, has argued, PLT may substitute for commitment if the latter is 
not possible.
3
 
Historically, it has been successfully implemented by the Swedish RiksBank (1931-1937) 
and, since 2006, has been systematically on the research agenda of the Bank of Canada. Note, 
moreover, that empirically, Fair (2008), after testing multiple specifications, concludes that 
the equation for the price level, is the preferred specification in a structural price-wage model.  
Although, PLT has been sparsely analyzed from the determinacy perspective, it has never 
been done so in an open economy. In view of the particular findings of Dittmar and 
Gavin(2005) and Ambler and Lam(2015), regarding inflation indeterminacy, we purport to 
investigate the properties of a Taylor rule, adapted to price level targeting, in a dynamic open 
economy. The latter integrates the key role of the exchange rate and its various channels of 
influence, in to the transmission process; in particular, critical is the role of the exchange rate 
presence in the wage-price sector as well in the demand sector, as my personal research, and 
the extensive work of Froyen and Guender (2007) ,Guender (2011)  have clearly shown.  
We shall approach the issue at hand, both in analytic and algorithmic terms, but it is through 
the latter perspective, that more informative light shall be provided. Emerging results and 
detailed comments thereof, appear in the final section. 
The specifics of the skeletal model to be used and the technical issues involved, shall be 
discussed in what follows. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 : I. Fisher has been a prominent early proponent. 
3
 : What price level to aim for, is a rather contested issue; there appears some consensus that domestic price 
level is the right choice, if there exists price stickiness (see for e.g. De Paoli,2009, among others) 
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2. THE MODEL 
Consider the following dynamic open economy model, suitably adapted to our purposes. We 
begin with the New Keynesian IS forward-looking equation which has been formulated, in the 
light of Liu (2006), Gali (2008) and, especially, Guender (2011)
4
:   
𝑌𝑡 = −𝛷1  𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡  𝜃𝑃𝑡+1 +  1 − 𝜃  Et+1 + 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓  −  𝜃𝑃𝑡 +  1 − 𝜃  Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓    +
𝛷2 Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 Et+1 + 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡+1  + 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1 + 𝛷3 𝑌𝑡
𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1
𝑓  + 𝜐𝑡                                      
(2.1) 
where :   𝐶𝑃𝐼=    𝜃𝑃𝑡 +  1 − 𝜃  Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓                                                                                                         
𝑌 = output; 𝑃 = Domestic Price Level, 𝑟 = nominal interest rate , E = Domestic currency 
units per unit of foreign currency, 𝑃𝑓 = Foreign Price Level, 𝑌𝑓= Foreign 
Output; 𝜐𝑡~𝑁 0, 𝜎𝜐
2 . Expectations are supposed to be rational, and variables (except for 
interest rates) are typically in logarithms. The steady state rate of inflation is constant, which 
in full equilibrium could be taken as zero 
5
.   
What follows provides a comprehensive model description. Equation (2.1) is the output 
equation which postulates that output is equal to total consumption, consisting of home goods 
consumption by domestic households and consumption of home goods relative to foreign 
ones by foreigners.  
As regards the pricing scheme, we follow, unlike earlier studies, the Rotemberg (1982) inter-
temporal optimizing framework where firms face intra and inter-temporal quadratic costs of 
adjustment:  
                                                          
4
 : Guender, in particular, spells out with clarity, the micro-founded underpinnings. 
5
 : Inflation targeting countries, set a target ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 percent (Svensson,1999). 
Woodford(1999),  Cecchetti (2000), discuss when Inflation Targeting amounts to Price Level Path Targeting. 
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
       ,  >0                      2.2) 
The ensuing conditions (2.3)-(2.3a):  
                                         𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡
∗ + 𝛼3𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1                                             ( 2.3) 
                                
11 2 3 3
α +α +α =1, α α  where ξ =discount factor=0.99        (2.3a)   
                                    with α1=κ/κ+μ+ξκ, α2=μ/κ+μ+ξκ, α3=ξκ/κ+μ+ξκ           
                 𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝛾1 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌  + 𝛾2 Et +  𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑘
𝑖=1                        (2.4)  
obtain after optimizing with respect to Pt and re-parameterizing, and lay down a scheme 
comprising: a) a predetermined price variable, b) a forward -looking price term and c) a an ex-
post equilibrium” price term, 
*
tP , that would have prevailed if there were no price frictions. 
Complexity is enhanced, as the scheme encompasses, both, backward-looking as well as 
forward - looking terms. Equation (2.4) is derived from neoclassical first principles and flows 
from a price- flexible equilibrium frame, where  
*
tP  is given in terms of a mark-up augmented 
marginal cost.  
 It has been assumed that the nominal wage rate component of the marginal cost, follows a 
scheme indexed to the CPI, with allowance being made for the outcome to be endogenously 
affected, by the sluggishness or tightness in the labour market, captured by tY Y
6
. The 
marginal cost is further extended to include the domestic currency price of foreign inputs, 
which enter a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
                                     
1
t
i
ittN ZY
 
     i =2,3,….           (2.5) 
 where   ( X = real variable, lnX X ), Y =real output, N =labour,Z i=foreign input i. 
                                                          
6
 : The  ’s are composite parameters and the relevant mark-up is assumed to vary inversely with output. 
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The derived marginal cost equation involves standard calculus, but it is lengthy due to the 
presence of more than  two  substitutable factor inputs.  Foreign currency prices are 
denominated in terms of a leading currency. 
Equation (2.4) is a contemporaneous linear feedback rule which may be labeled as flexible price 
targeting. Note, as Taylor did, that both policy reaction coefficients are positive, indicating a policy 
“against the wind” vis-à-vis the specified policy objectives. Taylor presented empirical estimates in his 
description of U.S monetary policy making, refraining however, from a normative suggestion 
regarding the size of ΦP relative to ΦY,  except for the requirement  that ΦP be >1 ; on the whole, his 
approach was basically empirical.   
We stipulate the policy rule: 
                                         ( ) ( )t t tP Yr P P Y Yr                                                      (2.6) 
where  r  is the natural rate of interest, and  is the steady inflation rate which may be constant or 
zero. Under PLT, however, the latter would be conceptually more appropriate. It would be instructive, 
at this point, to see the mechanics of PLT and its subtle difference with IT, when steady state inflation 
is positive (see, also, Cover and Pecorino (2005)). 
Let us suppose that: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜋       (2.7) 
𝜋𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝛵  
or     𝜋𝑡
𝛵 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝛢 = 𝑃𝑡−1
𝛵 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝛢 + 𝜋                           (2.7a) 
  𝜋𝑡
𝛵 − 𝜋 =   𝜋 𝑡
𝛵 = −(𝑃𝑡−1
𝛢 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝛵 )               (2.7b) 
𝑃𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 ,    𝑃𝑡−1
𝛢 = 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 − 1,  
𝜋 𝑡
𝛵 = 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
This shows that under PLT, there is a linkage between past and present, known as the “memory” 
property. If  𝑃𝑡−1
𝑇 > 𝑃 𝑡−1
𝐴 ,  then at time t, target inflation is higher than steady state inflation, 
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i.e.,   𝜋𝑡
𝛵 > 𝜋 , and vice-versa,  if otherwise; correctional forces are built in PLT, which are absent 
under IT. 
 International financial linkages are depicted through an uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, 
tying exchange rates with interest rates. The exchange rate, in particular, plays a key role, since it 
exerts a dual transmission effect, affecting (in opposite directions), both, the sector of production (the 
foreign inputs effect) and the sector of demand (the price competitiveness effect).  
The UIP equation takes either of two equivalent versions: 
                                rt =rt
f
+ E tEt+1 - Et                                             (2.8a) 
                           
1 1 1
( )
ff
t t t t tt t tE E E R E Rr r                                             (2.8b) 
Where RER=Real Exchange Rate ( E+ Pf –P),  rf is the foreign rate of interest, πft+1, is foreign 
rate of inflation, E is the familiar expectations symbol, and Δ is the difference operator. For our 
purposes, it is deemed appropriate to retain the original version. 
All foreign variables  ( except for Zit) are assumed to follow a white noise pattern. These 
assumptions have been made with a view to reduce the dimensions involved, and concentrate 
on a (second order) three difference equations system, where the forward expectations of 
variables are given in terms of current and lagged counterparts. We denote with a hat all 
variables relative to their steady state and make more compact the expectations notation. 
Substituting equation (2.6) into (2.1) and (2.8a) and, moreover, (2.4) into (2.3), performing all 
the necessary algebra, and collecting forward expectations on the left-hand side, we obtain our 
canonical model in matrix notation: 
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1, 1
10 1, 20 30 1
1, 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
e
tt t t
e
t t t t
e
t t t t
Y Y Y
C P C P C P
 
 
 
    
    
     
    
        
E E E
        
        Where C10, C20 and C30 are as follows: 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
10 3 20 2 1 2 2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
0 0 1
0 1 1 1
Y P
Y P
C C
   
    
                
      
   
       
 
30 1
0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0
C 
 
  
 
  
        
1 2 1 2
1 2
3
1
10
3
3
( ) [ (1 ) ]
1 [ (1 ) ]
1
0 0
1
0 1
C
 





      
     
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  Pre-multiplying by 1
10C
 , we obtain the following canonical form of the model: 
                    
1, 1
1 1
1, 10 30 110 20
1, 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ0 0 1
e
t t t t
e
t t t t
t t t t
Y Y Y
P P C C PC C
 
 
 
 
      
      
        
      
            
E E E
                           (2.10)              
Let 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
t
t
t
Y
M P
 
 
  
 
  
E
, then the homogenous solution is M =
6
0
0
t
i i
i
n m 

 where in the i eigen vector 
and i the i eigen value which obtains, from a 6
th
 degree polynomial equation having 
common factor 2 . Factoring it out, we derive a 4th degree polynomial equation (with a 
constant term inclusive of ,
P Y  ). 
Let, A(λ) be  the 4rth degree polynomial: 
                                4 3 23 2 1 0A A A A                   (2.11) 
LaSalle (1986), provides with clarity the conditions which if and only if they hold, then 
stability exists. The conditions are: 
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 
2 2
2 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1a A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A           , 
   
0 1 3 2 0
,1 1b cA A A A A                                                                         (2.12) 
Where in our case, A3=f 3 (A, Ψ)                                                                      (2.12a)           
                            A2=f2 (A, B, Γ, Δ, Ψ)                                                               (2.12b) 
                   Α1=f1(A,B,Γ,Δ,Ψ)                                                 (2.12c)         
                   Α0=f0( A,Γ,Δ,Ψ)      (2.12d) 
                  Ψ=(γ1,γ2,α1,α2,α3)    (2.12e)       
𝐴 = 1 + 𝛷1𝛷𝑌𝑎2𝛾1  
𝛷1𝜃+𝛷2− 𝛷1 1−𝜃 −𝛷2 
𝑎3
 −𝛷𝑌 𝛷1 1 − 𝜃 − 𝛷2  
𝛣 = 𝛷1𝛷𝑃 + 𝛷1𝜃 + 𝛷2 +
 𝛷1 1−𝜃 −𝛷2 −(𝛷1𝜃+𝛷2)
𝑎3
−  𝛷𝑌 1 − 𝜃 − 𝛷2 𝛷𝑃  
𝛤 = 𝑎2𝛾2  
𝛷1𝜃 + 𝛷2 −  𝛷1 1 − 𝜃 − 𝛷2 
𝑎3
  
𝛥 = 𝑎1  
𝛷1𝜃 + 𝛷2 −  𝛷1 1 − 𝜃 − 𝛷2 
𝑎3
  
 
  By construction two roots are equal to zero. We shall appeal to the Blanchard-Khan 
(1980) theorem, as the basis of our analysis; in our case, three characteristic roots/eigen 
values must be outside the unit circle, since there exists a triplet of non-predetermined 
variables. Analytically, the emerging LaSalle conditions are extremely intractable to draw 
conclusions from. Accordingly, the only route is to approach the problem algorithmically, 
a theme to which we now turn.  
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                     3.   RESULTS   AND   DISCUSSION     
We begin by stipulating that ΦP and ΦY belong to an interval, broadly in line with topical 
literature (Dittmar and Gavin,2005; Ambler and Lam,2015). To derive the four 
characteristic roots, satisfying the Blanchard-Khan theorem, we make use the following set 
of calibration values
7
: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 3 70.6, 0.40, 0.25, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2513, 0.5, 0.248                
[0,2] [0,2]))( (P Y   
 
The proposed algorithm is a device specifically developed to perform a grid search using 
0.1 as a step in deriving 𝛷𝑌  and  𝛷𝑃 . The result is a map of correspondence between 
policy coefficients and a determinate equilibrium outcome. 
Solutions obtain (discretely) across the entire spectrum examined and enlighten the 
question of determinacy regarding the nature of macroeconomic dynamics in the open 
economy
8
.What we observe is that at the lower end of spectrum, ΦP   is lower than ΦY, 
while at the other (higher) end the spectrum, we obtain the more typical result where ΦP is 
greater than ΦY. Ιn general, however, the value of ΦY  has been found to be higher than in 
other topical studies. It stands to reason to surmise, that at the lower end of the spectrum, a 
higher ΦΥ   makes up for the lower value of ΦP, so that a sufficient overall response is 
secured
9
. Our results, apart from the higher ΦY value, are broadly conformable with those 
of Ambler and Lam (2015).  Algebraically put, we have: 
                                0 1,9 , 0 1,7P Y          
                                                          
7
 : Some values have been adopted from Froyen and Guender (2007,p.268); appropriate references cited, have 
also provided useful guidance. The value of    has been taken from World Bank Statistics. 
8
 : On the whole, there obtain 47 solutions regarding the admissible roots. These are discretely different, but 
only marginally so. 
9
 : The inter-relationship, between ΦP and ΦY, emerges in analytical terms, in the determinacy condition 
derived by Bullard and Mitra (2002). It could be argued that our finding is the algorithmic counterpart. 
11 
 
 Our perspective is normative in nature and not descriptive. Operationally, however, 
concerns have been expressed about a stronger response to the output gap, for the reasons 
outlined in McCallum (2001). 
According to our findings, the Taylor monetary rule should be normatively construed as a 
flexible policy framework, where for admissible values of policy coefficients, one may 
eclectically choose the more appropriate combination, in the face of the economic 
conjuncture. In fact, this is not incongruous with pragmatic policy experience. 
Froyen and Guender (2007) and Guender (2011) have found drastic implications (from a 
stabilization perspective) for their results in the topics explored, depending on the presence 
or not, of an exchange rate channel in the pricing scheme
10
. Motivated by this, we repeat 
our analysis by setting 
2
  equal to zero and examine the implications for the determinacy 
issue. The deeper essence of the foregoing results does not change much. The whole 
picture changes only quantitatively, noting that, on average, ΦY, is higher than before.  
Widespread openness is what it matters, in sense that the exchange rate permeates, both, 
demand and supply sectors, in contrast to a fully closed economy. Analytical conditions for 
determinacy are extremely difficult to explore analytically, which makes compelling the 
algorithmic approach. By contrast, the closed economy case studied by Bullard and Mitra 
(2002), had a set-up consisting of (a first order) 2x2 system, in which case, they 
analytically derived that ΦP>1(when ΦY=0). 
Using the determinacy criterion, our results imply that opening up the economy, on all 
counts, favors the case for a flexible PLT. Further support for this, comes from another 
source (Batini and Yates, 2003, p.294) whose analysis, is notably, predicated not on the 
                                                          
10
 : Guender (2011), for example, showed that when γ2 >0, monetary policy from a timeless perspective is not 
equivalent to policy under discretion unlike the case of a closed economy . 
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determinacy criterion, but on that of the minimum variance of target variables. The fact 
that their result is derived through the use of a different procedure, adds robustness to our 
finding. It is found, in this connection, that openness enhances the performance of a rule 
approaching a flexible PLT relative to other policy targets, on condition that, policy 
makers follow a simple, contemporaneous policy rule, as the one used by Taylor (1993). 
Yet further support for PLT (relative to IT), comes from another source, (Guender and Oh, 
Do Yoon, 2006), who find a more favorable trade-off with output under the former regime. 
Reverting, after this useful digression, to our own line if inquiry, we notice that only at the 
higher end of our value spectrum, the precept of the Taylor Principle, stressing a robust 
nominal rate response, holds mutatis-mutandis, to the case of the price level (in a dynamic 
open economy). This, in its own right, qualifies earlier findings concerning the closed 
economy.  
In summary, our piece has demonstrated that determinacy is compatible with the case 
where a Taylor rule (adapted to a flexible form of PLT) in in operation in an open 
economy. Both goals (price and output stability) are significant; the relation between the 
policy coefficients depends on the low or high end of their value spectrum. Taylor’s 
principle, as such, receives only partial support.  Further, it is shown that the Taylor 
framework defines a normative menu of admissible policy choices; the question of which 
may be selected, depends on the economic conjuncture. The case for a flexible PLT is 
supported, in a setting where thorough openness, has drastic implications relative to those 
of a closed economy. 
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